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PLAYING GOD: WHO SHOULD REGULATE 
EMBRYO RESEARCH?*
Baroness Ruth Deech**
t is an honor to be able to celebrate the Belfer family: Ira M. Belfer, 
member of the Class of 1933, who went on to become a distin-
guished practitioner of law and a major supporter of Brooklyn Law 
School; his son Myron, Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical 
School and Senior Consultant in Child Mental Health for the World 
Health Organization. The careers and actions of father and son together 
embody generosity of spirit, a love of legal education, and the desire to 
put the advances of medicine to use in the interest of children all over the 
world. These qualities are highly appropriate to the subject that I am to 
address today. 
I 
The title of my lecture was inspired by a comment made to me in 2002 
by a Member of Parliament (MP) when I gave evidence to the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, which was 
examining embryo research. The MP queried the decision of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), of which I was then the 
chairman, to permit a couple to benefit from the new technique of em-
bryo selection. Mr. and Mrs. Hashmi have a son called Zain, who suffers 
from a family-inherited condition of beta-thalassaemia. The Hashmis 
sought to have preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) carried out on 
embryos that they would produce in order to be able to select one that 
would be free of the inherited genetic condition and which would also, if 
it developed into a baby, provide tissue that was compatible with Zain. 
Zain needed bone marrow from a compatible donor to save his life. I ex-
plained to the Committee of Members of Parliament that the HFEA had 
felt confident in making this decision within the law and that it was ethi-
cally sound. Moreover, I explained, speed was of the essence in such a 
situation. Little Zain suffered every day from the invasive treatment that 
he required and his mother was getting no younger. I knew that if a deci-
sion on an issue of this magnitude and sensitivity were to be left to legis-
lators, not only would it take a very long time depending on the legisla-
tive timetable but it would inevitably attract media and constituent inter-
est. Legislators would vote not only with the broader issue in mind but 
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also with politics at the forefront.1 When I appraised this dilemma by 
saying that the HFEA undertook these decisions according to law de-
signed in order to protect legislators from having to make them, the re-
sponse of the MP was: “Who do you think you are, playing God?” But 
“playing God” was precisely, in my view, the role assigned to the HFEA 
by Parliament itself. Moreover, “playing God” may mean either assum-
ing to oneself the power to make decisions that no one on earth should be 
making; or it may mean doing one’s human best to act as a partner with 
God in improving the lot of mankind and, where necessary, attempting to 
perfect God’s creation. 
It was on that occasion that I realized that even though issues of PGD 
and stem cell research are discussed as if they were ones purely of ethics, 
law, and science, the realm of assisted reproductive technology is a bat-
tleground fought over by legislators jealous of their power, desperate 
patients, clinicians and companies with considerable earnings, and reli-
gious pressure groups. I concluded that the only way to keep the peace is 
by comprehensive regulation by as neutral and expert a body of people as 
can be assembled. Any other solutions result in distortions and inconsis-
tencies. 
These political and financial aspects of embryo research regulation are 
masked by various ethical and religious approaches. After introducing 
the arguments about ethics and embryo research, I will unmask them by 
explaining the nature of stem cell research and examining the stances of 
Germany, the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom and their 
internal inconsistencies. I will weigh up regulation and autonomy and 
propose a framework of legislative regulation. I will take as examples the 
new areas of embryo research where the HFEA took decisions under my 
 
 1. The tussle between religious forces and parliamentary ones in this field is made 
clear by the comment of Pope Benedict at Easter 2006: “There is a move to reinvent 
mankind, to modify the very grammar of life as willed by God . . . . [T]o take God’s 
place, without being God is insane arrogance, a risky and dangerous venture.” Pope 
Benedict XVI, Good Friday Prayer at the Colosseum in Rome (Apr. 14, 2006). The same 
opinion was voiced in England when the license for PGD offered to the clinic that treated 
the Hashmi family was challenged as illegal by CORE, a group fundamentally opposed to 
any form of interference with the embryo at any stage. R (on the Application of Quinta-
valle) v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., [2005] UKHL 28, [2005] 2 A.C. 561. 
CORE stated that the reason they challenged the HFEA in court over the use of PGD for 
tissue-typing purposes was not to obtain a pronouncement on whether the technique was 
right or wrong in itself, but to make the point that such a policy decision should be made 
by a democratically elected government, not by an “unelected” organization, namely the 
HFEA. The gesture was too late because in 2001–2002 both houses of the British Parlia-
ment voted strongly in favor of extending the remit of the HFEA to cover research on 
embryos for the purposes of treating and learning about serious disease. 
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chairmanship, techniques which have adapted established In Vitro Fer-
tilization (IVF) procedures to lifesaving and life-altering purposes. 
I. EMBRYOS 
At the heart of the new ethical debate lie attitudes towards embryos 
and in particular their use for research. It is very well-known that it is 
regarded as morally wrong by some because they regard the embryo as 
human from the moment of fertilization, and therefore one should not 
take its life or bring it into existence simply in order to be destroyed. 
This, they say, is as true of the embryo as of children and adults. Indeed, 
one may take the argument a step further, because if one should not de-
stroy something with the potential to become a human, this could apply 
equally to eggs, for eggs alone can be converted into embryos through 
the cloning technique. Up to 70% of natural embryos in the body never 
succeed in implanting in any case and are lost. The reductio ad absur-
dum of protection of the embryo is that natural intercourse should be 
avoided because that is bound to lead to the loss of some fertilized em-
bryos.2 Alternatively and equally unrealistic, if each embryo is a possible 
life and should not be wasted, then because all fertile adults are capable 
of combining to produce embryos at every moment of the day, we should 
do so incessantly in order to avoid any possibility of wasted potential. 
The Warnock Committee, whose 1984 Report laid down the founda-
tions of regulation, reached a typically British compromise: in English 
law the embryo has been given special status but not absolute protec-
tion.3 In Britain, the embryo is treated as an entity deserving due atten-
tion, which means that is to be used only if there is no alternative, that its 
use must be ruled by informed consent of the donors, that there are re-
strictions on exporting embryos or mixing them with non-human mate-
rial, and that there is considerable recordkeeping to ensure that every 
single embryo in research is accounted for. 
The embryo is defined in section 1 of the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act 1990 (HFE Act) as a “live human embryo where fertilisa-
tion is complete.”4 The United Kingdom was the first country in the 
world to acknowledge as legal and then regulate therapeutic cloning or 
 
 2. See John Harris, Stem Cells, Sex, and Procreation, 12 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTH-
CARE ETHICS 353 (2003). 
 3. This compromise has been upheld by the HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE 
REPORT ON STEM CELL RESEARCH, REPORT, 2002, H.L. 83-I, § 4.21. 
 4. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 1(1)(a), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/Ukpga_19900037_en_2.htm#mdiv1. 
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cell nuclear replacement (CNR). This technique of artificially fertilizing 
an egg which has been enucleated was challenged in the courts.5
The House of Lords confirmed that embryos created by CNR did come 
within the regulatory purview of the HFEA; they reached this conclusion 
by taking a purposive approach to the interpretation of the word “em-
bryo.”6 This decision on the one hand upheld the democratic or parlia-
mentary approach to this new field in that it supported the remit of the 
existing law, but it also enabled the regulators to extend their reach. 
The position in Britain now is that a wide range of embryo research 
may be permitted under license from the HFEA. The extended list of 
purposes for which research involving embryos may be permitted is: pro-
moting advances in the treatment of infertility; increasing knowledge 
about the causes of congenital disease and the causes of miscarriage; de-
veloping more effective techniques for contraception; developing meth-
ods for detecting the presence of gene or chromosome abnormalities be-
fore implantation; increasing knowledge about the development of em-
bryos, knowledge about serious disease, or enabling such knowledge to 
be applied in developing treatment for serious disease.7
A word of explanation about the science behind the arguments over the 
status of embryos. Two non-fertility avenues are being explored. One is 
PGD and the other is research on adult and embryonic stem cells, derived 
respectively from adult cells and embryos. The latter can further be di-
vided into research on embryos created by uniting eggs and sperm, and 
research on embryos created by CNR. The latter technique involves ob-
taining an egg, which is subsequently enucleated. The removed nucleus 
is replaced by the nucleus of a cell obtained from an adult, possibly an 
adult who requires treatment or a volunteer. The new nucleus is fused to 
the enucleated egg by an electric shock. This apparently causes the egg 
to believe that it has been fertilized as if by sperm, and it starts to grow. 
The advantage of CNR is that the resulting embryo will be identical in 
every respect to the genetic makeup of the adult who donated the nu-
cleus. Were stem cell lines to be derived from this embryo and new or-
gans and tissues created, the adult patient would not reject the new organ, 
for it would be 100% compatible with his own body. This would end the 
current position whereby recipients of donated organs have to spend the 
 
 5. The grounds were that the statutory definition did not appear to include embryos 
created by processes that do not involve the union of egg and sperm. CNR does not in-
volve sperm in the creation of the embryo. R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v Sec’y 
of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13, [2003] 2 A.C. 687. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001, S.I. 
2001/188, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2001/20010188.htm. 
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rest of their lives on immuno-suppressive drugs to prevent their bodies 
rejecting “stranger” organs. 
The legislative approval of extended research purposes in England was 
based on the fact that the HFEA has a good record in ensuring that clin-
ics comply with the law and therefore an extension would not represent a 
slide down the slippery slope. By way of contrast, much harm has been 
done to the scientific community by the falsity of the claims of the Ko-
rean Professor Hwang, who claimed to have created thirty cloned em-
bryos and eleven stem cell lines. In 2006, it was reported that Professor 
Hwang used eggs donated by junior team members and faked his re-
search. There are two ethical issues here: the faked research and also the 
likelihood that pressure was applied to female members of the team to 
donate the gametes needed for the research. 
Bearing in mind the fate that befell Professor Hwang and his team, 
there is a need to govern and regulate the way in which eggs are ob-
tained. The HFEA is undertaking a public consultation on whether 
women should be permitted to donate eggs purely for use in medical re-
search. It is already legal in Britain to donate eggs for the purpose of 
pregnancy on an altruistic basis. Indeed, it is not uncommon for people 
willingly to give up organs and bone marrow to help others; voluntary 
kidney donation is quite widespread. This seems to point to the ethical or 
pragmatic acceptability of the donation of eggs for medical research, 
even though there is risk to the donor and no direct benefit to herself. 
The drugs used can be dangerous and the generous payment of expenses 
to donors, or even the possibility of sale of eggs, as in the United States, 
for large sums, may tempt the needy. 
II. STEM CELLS 
Stem cells present the most exciting possibilities for the future, al-
though as yet undeveloped. They are the basic components of the rest of 
the body and capable of providing new cells. They are found in embryos, 
in the fetus, the placenta and umbilical cord, and in parts of the body. 
When the embryo has grown to the eight-cell stage soon after fertiliza-
tion, each of the eight is totipotent; that is, it could develop into any and 
every type of cell needed for the body. Some days later when stem cells 
are present in the inner cell mass they are still pluripotent, that is have 
the capacity to develop into most types of cell. Because of their ability to 
reproduce themselves and develop into other types of cells, stem cells 
offer the prospect of growing new tissue to repair parts of the body dam-
aged by accident or ill health and to treat a wide range of diseases that 
have developed because the cells have degenerated, e.g., Alzheimer’s, 
Parkinson’s, and diabetes. If those treatments can be found, there would 
326 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:2 
be a lifelong cure and new regenerative tissue when needed. Stem cell 
research has been widely publicized and is seen as a good focus for fi-
nancial investment and medical research. Adult stem cells, unlike em-
bryonic ones, are allegedly not as useful for growth and research, al-
though opinions differ and knowledge is limited so far. The problem with 
adult stem cells is that if they are derived from an adult with a disease, 
the likelihood is that the stem cell may reinforce that disease rather than 
cure it. Nevertheless, adult stem cells are of significance because work 
on them does not present the ethical problems associated with work on 
embryos, whether surplus to requirement after IVF or deliberately cre-
ated. Most stem cell research is carried out on embryos surplus to re-
quirement, and it must be ethically preferable to use them for beneficial 
research than to allow them to perish. 
In Britain, work on stem cells derived from surplus or created embryos 
is legal and was recommended by the HFEA. It has to be approved by 
scientific peers and ethics committees and the license from the HFEA 
takes into account quality approval, justification, legal compliance, con-
sent, and yearly accounting for each one used. This is strict but effective 
and gives researchers an area of safety and respectability in which to 
proceed. So far fifteen licenses have been granted. 
The research license is granted only if the use of embryos is necessary 
and the aim is necessary or desirable for the treatment of infertility or 
serious disease. “Serious” is a fluid concept depending on time and 
place. As time brings reduced tolerance of ill health and greater expecta-
tions of relief, the band of diseases regarded as serious will expand. Un-
der British regulation a sample of every stem cell line derived from a cell 
taken from an embryo or adult must be deposited in the U.K. Stem Cell 
Bank, which was set up in 2004 by the Medical Research Council and 
the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council. Research 
is only licensed if it cannot be done from existing stem cell lines in the 
Bank. The potential benefits are considerable, ranging from organs avail-
able for transplantation and ending the current shortage, to tailored drugs, 
discoveries about the genetic origins of diseases, and cures for infertility. 
Gametes might be derived from stem cells to provide reproduction for 
the infertile. 
III. NATIONAL ATTITUDES TO STEM CELL RESEARCH 
Despite these advantages there has been a diversity of response to this 
research in Europe and the United States. This is because of cultural, re-
ligious, and economic reasons specific to each country. In some, feelings 
run so high that they cannot reach a compromise position, for example, 
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using only surplus embryos. Belgium and Holland permit embryo re-
search and have no legislation; Portugal and Germany forbid it.8
A. Germany 
The contrasting ethical attitudes can be seen most clearly in the case of 
Germany. Abortion is permitted but embryo research is not,9 despite the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of research. No egg may be fertilized 
except for the pregnancy of the donor and, as in Italy, there may be no 
initial creation of surplus embryos. This has the effect of preventing 
PGD. Nevertheless, stem cell lines may be imported into Germany pro-
vided they were derived before 2002 and subject to restrictions. In that 
year German law prohibited the derivation of new stem cell lines, even if 
not defined as embryos. As in the United States, there is a certain amount 
of ethical hypocrisy in Germany in that there is reliance on stem cell 
lines created outside the country. The policy is set in the context of hu-
man rights and a historical perspective, a determination not to repeat the 
mistakes of the past, to integrate the disabled, and to protect women and 
children. 
B. Italy 
Italy was until recently the most unregulated country in Europe. It was 
the place to which one went for the treatment of women over sixty, for 
attempts at cloning, sex and race selection, and embryo splitting. How-
ever, in 2004 a comprehensive law was introduced.10 Gamete donation is 
banned, as is egg freezing. The number of embryos that may be used per 
cycle is limited to three, no scientific research on embryos is permitted, 
and there can be no PGD. Couples seeking IVF must be of two different 
sexes, married or living together, and no posthumous treatment is al-
lowed. The law amounts to a set of prohibitions rather than the construc-
 
 8. The Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, article 18, 
provides that where the law allows for embryo research it must ensure adequate protec-
tion for the embryo and that the deliberate creation of embryos for research is prohibited. 
Council of Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine art. 18, Apr. 4, 1997, 
36 I.L.M. 817, Europ. T.S. No 164. Cloning is prohibited and this is reinforced by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union art. 3, Dec. 7, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 266. There are few ratifications. This 
is because in England and some other countries acceptance of the research has moved on 
well beyond the European declarations, affected as they are by religious susceptibilities 
and history. 
 9. Herbert Gottweis, Stem Cell Policies in the United States and in Germany: Be-
tween Bioethics and Regulation, 30 POL’Y STUD. J. 444, 451 (2002) (discussing Ger-
many’s 1990 Embryo Protection Act). 
 10. Law 40/2004, Feb. 14, 2004, Gazz. Uff. No. 45 (Feb. 24, 2004). 
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tion of a general regulatory framework for the conduct of assisted repro-
duction. It penetrates a long way into the area of medical discretion, for 
example banning embryo freezing and limiting the number of embryos 
that may be transferred in one cycle, thereby reducing the success rate. 
The law goes even further than the report of the Dulbecco Commission 
that preceded it, which had recommended that stem cell research should 
be allowed on surplus embryos. The Italian law has been condemned by 
some European research organizations in that it greatly reduces the 
chances of an infertile woman bearing a baby, but it was not voted down 
by the electorate when they were given the opportunity. The new law is 
of course wholly consistent with the dominant Catholic religion of the 
country. 
C. The United States 
The position in the United States is perhaps the most troubling and in-
consistent of all, and its results affect the whole world. The stance is de-
rived from a combination of politics, business, religion, and aversion to 
federal control. Any general regulation or ethics directive is seen as un-
dermining the doctor-patient relationship and imposing bureaucracy on 
medicine. Freedom of state action has led to rule by market forces, a 
general free for all which in turn leads to doctor-patient-baby conflicts of 
interest, abuses, and dangerous genetic “cures.” The regulation that has 
been attempted by professional bodies in the United States has proved 
ineffective because no consensus has been reached on the main issues 
and the guidelines are unenforceable at law. These issues are all bound 
up with the very sensitive American position on abortion and the tension 
over childbearing issues between religious forces and the constitutional 
rights to privacy and liberty.11 Any legislation that interfered with, for 
example, the “right” to clone could be open to constitutional review by 
the courts. Much as the United States needs federal regulation of embryo 
research, it is particularly difficult to achieve because of the Constitution, 
guarantees of state and personal autonomy, and the political/religious 
lobby. 
American law prohibits the use of federal funds for the creation of a 
human embryo for research purposes. This means that private clinics and 
company laboratories are free to undertake research. In 2001, President 
Bush announced that federal funding may be used for research on exist-
ing stem cell lines, but no others, and set up the Council on Bioethics 
under the chairmanship of Leon Kass, a conservative thinker. The effect 
of the law is that no live embryo may be destroyed for research pur-
 
 11. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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poses.12 It is believed that there are seventy-eight existing stem cell lines 
eligible for federal funding for research, of which twelve have become 
available to the United States so far and are regarded as unsuitable. Fed-
eral funds may be spent on adult non-embryonic stem cells, to which no 
constraints apply. There is little open and informed debate of the issues 
in the United States because there is no public accountability for embry-
onic research and no unified voice speaking for it, only presidential dik-
tat. Private companies are doing considerable unsupervised research, 
which is profitable and hard to square with concerns over public health. 
The current position is as unethical as it can be: the public sector is ob-
structed while private work is unregulated and driven by commercial 
concerns. There should be no pretence that the Bush pronouncement of 
2001 was ethical as claimed: it was one of political expedience prevail-
ing over all the scientific and logical arguments pointing the other way. 
There are ways around the ban. A single cell detached from an early 
embryo can be grown in culture to create stem cell lines, without de-
stroying the embryo. It could theoretically be used to attempt pregnancy, 
even with one cell removed, as occurs after preimplantation genetic di-
agnosis, although this would be contrary to English law. Keeping the 
embryo alive would address the ethical concerns of many, but it is not as 
efficient as culturing the entire eight-cell embryo. This might be a way to 
circumvent the federal funding ban. There is pressure from pro-life 
groups to find alternatives to destroying embryos to grow stem cells. It is 
a counter-productive search, however, as many embryos are destroyed in 
pursuit of this one result. Recently, in British laboratories scientists have 
taken cells from dead embryos and grown them to the stage where stem 
cells might be extracted. The scientists used embryos that had died natu-
rally during IVF treatment. The embryos in this experiment had stopped 
developing a few days after fertilization. Nevertheless, the question was 
immediately raised of how one would know that the embryos were dead, 
and whether there was something wrong with those embryos that caused 
the arrest of their development. Other ethicists however regarded this 
new process as akin to organ donation from dead patients, with no more 
concerns than surround that process. 
The moral arguments have been turned on their heads however by the 
fact that very recently some states, led by New Jersey and California, 
have legislated for state funding for stem cell research.13 This may lead 
 
 12. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128(2), 110 Stat. 
26, 34 (1996). 
 13. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Embryonic and Fetal Re-
search Laws, www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/embfet.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2007), for a useful list. 
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to a movement of scientists from restrictive states to those that are more 
liberal. California Proposition 7114 of 2004 granted $3 billion funding to 
stem cell research. The measure included the establishment of the Cali-
fornia Institute for Regenerative Medicine to regulate and oversee stem 
cell research. The Act has a preamble stating that half of California fami-
lies have a member who has or will suffer from a medical condition that 
could be treated with stem cell therapies. The Act is designed to plug the 
gap in federal funding and to shift the emphasis of health care towards 
prevention rather than expensive cures. It will presumably give a boost to 
the prestigious Californian universities’ research programs. Human re-
productive cloning remains forbidden but otherwise all types of research 
on all types of embryos may be carried out. Accountability is to be 
achieved by open meetings and annual reports to the public. The Inde-
pendent Citizens’ Oversight Committee of twenty-nine members governs 
the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine and will include pa-
tient, university, and research representatives. The Act directs the Com-
mittee to establish standards concerning informed consent, controls on 
human research, the prohibition of compensation to donors, privacy laws, 
and time limits for obtaining cells (eight to twelve days after fertiliza-
tion). There are similar laws in New Jersey15 and a Stem Cell Institute of 
New Jersey, with a grant of state funds, albeit very small compared to 
California. 
There will soon be a patchwork of regulation across the United States 
and a scattering of states where funding for stem cell research will be 
provided. This will lead to scientific tourism, a reflection of the world 
situation. This is a further argument in favor of national control and a 
national regulatory body. This need is not met by the President’s Council 
on Bioethics, because it is allegedly composed of members chosen for 
their conservative views and appointed by the President, and it has no 
powers. My experience on the HFEA convinced me that to mix the 
pragmatic with the philosophical is the best way of going forward. There 
is nothing so invigorating for a committee containing ethicists as to be 
confronted with a case needing an immediate practical solution. Ques-
tions such as what to do when embryos are mixed up or lost, the use of 
embryos that are subject to litigation, the payment of donors in a situa-
tion of shortage, all force committee members to apply policy and prin-
ciples and come up with a legal and humane solution. 
 
 14. CAL. CONST. art. XXXV, § 1 (approved by the voters of California). 
 15. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-2 (West 1996 & Supp. 2006). 
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IV. THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATION 
On the basis of examination of the inconsistencies and weaknesses of 
various national situations, what may be concluded about the ideal regu-
latory framework? There may be comprehensive regulation or private 
rights and prohibitions, such as in Italy. There may be regulation or a 
free market as in the United States. There may be regulation by inde-
pendent committee or by legislators, which is the question in the United 
Kingdom. Britain was extremely fortunate in the timing of its legislation, 
as far back as 1990. It enacted a comprehensive framework before many 
of today’s issues emerged and before positions became entrenched. 
Hence when new issues arose, such as stem cell research, there was al-
ready a framework within which to control them, and the public and Par-
liament were accustomed to it. Britain was also fortunate in that the stat-
ute was well-drafted and was flexible enough to cope well to the present 
day, although reforms are now being considered.16
The most interesting analysis of national structures of regulation has 
been made by D.G. Jones and C.R. Towns.17 The authors describe four 
types of regulation of stem cell research. 
The first is the prohibition of all human embryo research: Ireland, Aus-
tria, Norway, and Poland. The second is permission to use stem cell lines 
already in existence before a certain date: the United States and Ger-
many. The third is to use stem cells only from embryos surplus to IVF 
requirements: Canada, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Taiwan, 
and Australia. The fourth is to allow also the creation of embryos spe-
cifically for research: the United Kingdom, Belgium, Israel, Singapore, 
Japan, South Korea, and Sweden.18
The authors then point out the inconsistencies.19 In some countries 
where all embryo research is forbidden because the embryo is sacrosanct, 
IVF is allowed. IVF cannot normally be carried out without engendering 
a certain number of embryos that are surplus to requirements and are 
eventually destroyed. This is more unethical than using them for research 
purposes. Germany and Italy are at least internally consistent in that they 
do not allow any embryos to be created that will not immediately be used 
for pregnancy, avoiding the creation of extra ones. This is at a cost of 
some detriment to the woman’s health. Instead of banking extra embryos, 
 
 16. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
AND THE LAW, 2004–5, H.C. 7-1, at 175–89. 
 17. D.G. Jones & C.R. Towns, Navigating the Quagmire: The Regulation of Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 21 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1113 (2006). 
 18. Id. at 1113–14. 
 19. Id. at 1114–16. 
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she will have to undergo ovarian stimulation by drugs repeatedly. Multi-
ple births are more likely to occur because all the embryos will be trans-
ferred in one attempt rather than using only one or two and keeping the 
remainder. Multiple births are dangerous to the health of mother and 
baby and costly to society. States that ban all embryo research are also 
quite likely to take advantage of stem cell research in other countries. In 
Germany the import of stem cell lines from other countries where they 
have been derived from surplus embryos is allowed under strict condi-
tions.20
If permission is given to use stem cells created before a certain date 
(the second category) they may be inappropriate for research and will 
eventually be too old. Those countries that prohibit the creation of new 
stem cell lines on the basis of the sanctity of the embryo are also likely to 
allow the destruction and creation of embryos for the purposes of IVF. 
The use of surplus embryos (the third category) does at least make a 
utilitarian use of embryos that are in existence and would otherwise per-
ish. However, the creation of embryos for research that are specific to the 
patient is blocked. This position accepts that surplus embryos will be 
created and destroyed during IVF and therefore accepts that embryos are 
disposable, despite imposing restrictions on research. The fourth cate-
gory, the most liberal one, is based on not accepting that every single 
embryo has human potential. It maximizes research opportunity and se-
cures a diversity of embryos for research, including ones that will be 
compatible for the purposes of transplantation. 
Another way of categorizing the different national attitudes to embryo 
research is to look at the contenders, the winners and losers. When no 
research is allowed at all or only on old stem cell lines, this is an advan-
tage for the religious/political factions. If prohibition can be evaded by 
import or export of gametes then commerce benefits but not patients and 
domestic researchers. If research is allowed only on surplus embryos, 
this inhibits scientists. If the most liberal attitude is taken, all interested 
parties benefit except that legislators are denied the control that they 
seek. 
The ethical positions are further muddied by the existence of “repro-
ductive tourism.” If patients, researchers, and gametes may move from 
country to country in search of the desired facilities that may be legally 
available to them, as is permitted to Europeans by the Treaty of Rome, 
 
 20. Stammzellgesetz [StZG] [Stem Cell Act], June 28, 2002, BGBl. I at 2277, § 4; see 
also Rosario M. Isasi & Bartha M. Knoppers, Beyond the Permissibility of Embryonic 
and Stem Cell Research: Substantive Requirements and Procedural Safeguards, 21 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 2474 (2006).  
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there is little point in restriction in a few countries, other than to send a 
signal. The ethics of the entire continent of Europe have to sink to the 
lowest point because the scientist who is unable to carry out embryo re-
search in Italy may move to England; the would-be patient who prefers 
to have an anonymous sperm donor may leave England or Sweden and 
go to Belgium; and so on. This situation highlights the need for a liberal 
regime in the knowledge that those who have principled objections need 
not take advantage of what is going on, but that it is safer and cheaper to 
have treatment in the home country. 
I conclude from this brief overview of the national positions that there 
is no substantive ethical or qualitative difference between research di-
rected to stem cell derivation and the use of embryos for IVF and general 
research. If one activity deserves attention and regulation, so do the oth-
ers. Stem cell research alone cannot be usefully singled out for regula-
tion, and indeed the regulation of stem cell research on its own is not ef-
ficient. 
V. THE HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM  
It is often asked by what moral right do the members of the HFEA 
pronounce on these issues. It is because it embodies the democratic com-
promise between strongly held views in society, reached by the HFE Act 
1990. The Authority works within the Act to reconcile opposing views 
and point to a way forward, with public accountability. The HFEA li-
censes and monitors clinics that carry out IVF treatments, donor insemi-
nation, and embryo research; it strives to ensure that treatment and re-
search are undertaken with respect for human life and responsibility to-
wards the parties, recognizing the vulnerability of patients and the ex-
pensive nature of the treatments. One in six couples seek infertility treat-
ment and there may be many more who are infertile but do not seek 
medical advice. Care should be taken not to exploit them. 
The HFEA regulates the storage of gametes, registers information 
about donors, treatments, and children, safeguarding the biggest database 
of its kind in the world. It issues a Code of Practice to clinics; gives ad-
vice and information to patients, donors, clinics, and the government; 
and keeps new developments under review. It has staff and premises in 
London, and twenty members selected openly on merit after advertise-
ment. It issues an annual report, holds open meetings, and keeps in touch 
with all elements of the relevant professions. Its overall aim is to ensure 
that public understanding and reassurance move at the same pace as the 
new developments that it licenses. In the sixteen years of its existence, 
the HFEA has overseen major steps forward in infertility treatment, ex-
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tending from “simple” IVF into matters of convenience, lifesaving, and 
life alteration.21 The HFEA has faced several legal challenges, all but 
one of which have failed.22 The HFEA is not universally popular with 
scientists, who resent the extra paperwork surrounding permission to 
pursue relevant research. It has however been successful in blocking the 
slippery slope. As far as is known, no one has tried to keep an embryo in 
vitro for more than fourteen days from fertilization, or has cloned, be-
cause policing of the laboratories is part of the system. 
Legal regulation in Britain has probably served to protect clinicians 
and scientists not only from legal action for malpractice (where they 
have followed the HFEA Code of Practice) but also to give them a shield 
against accusations of ethical malpractice, for they are acting within the 
parameters agreed by Parliament and the HFEA. These safeguards 
clearly do not apply where there has been a total breakdown in the clinic 
controls and the deliberate flouting of the criminal law, which has hap-
pened once or twice. 
Regulation has disadvantages too, as I shall show, but in general the 
history of regulation shows that work on embryos might never have been 
permitted in Britain at all had it not been for the existence of, at first, 
voluntary professional self-regulation and, subsequently, statutory con-
trols. It has progressed with reliability and in tandem with public and 
peer acceptability. Judged by those criteria, regulation in principle has 
been a successful move. In addressing issues relating to public fear of 
new technologies, family issues, safety, and extent, regulation has been 
more of a success than a failure. The HFEA has tried to achieve a judi-
cial use of its powers, combined with a consultative and consensual ap-
 
 21. E.g., HFEA, First PGD Guidelines, 1999, CE13/08/1999; Press Release, HFEA, 
HFEA to Permit Use of Frozen Eggs in Fertility Treatment (Jan. 25, 2000); 1994 HFEA 
ANN. REP. 18 (noting that the first ICSI licenses were granted in 1993). 
 22. Evans v. Amicus Healthcare [2004] EWCA Civ 727, [2005] Fam. 1 (upholding a 
man’s right to withhold consent to IVF treatment); R (on the Application of Assisted 
Reproduction & Gynaecology Centre) v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., 
[2002] EWCA Civ 20 (upholding the policy of limiting the numbers of embryos that may 
be transferred); R v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth. ex parte Blood [1999] 
Fam. 151 (permitting the use of sperm taken without his consent from a dying/dead man); 
see also R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology 
Auth., [2005] UKHL 28, [2005] 2 A.C. 561; R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v. 
Sec’y of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13, [2003] 2 A.C. 687. Recent decisions concern-
ing fertility treatment under the HFE Act have been affected by the introduction into 
British law of the European Human Rights Convention by the Human Rights Act, 1998, 
c. 42, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--d.htm. This gives greater 
weight to individual wishes. Nevertheless human rights law does not support an absolute 
right to have children or to be supplied with medical assistance to do so. 
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proach to regulation, and it aims to secure confidence and respect from 
Parliament, the public, patient groups, and the professions. Parliament, 
having set the framework, can rely on the Authority for the day-to-day 
management of the many legal and ethical issues that have emerged from 
the field. 
VI. REGULATION FOR ALL? 
Is regulation a good thing for the whole world? It has certainly 
achieved a great deal in Britain without too much dissent. There are 
some deeper issues that need consideration however. How does regula-
tion square with human rights and autonomy? What issues should be set-
tled in the legislation and what left to the discretion of the regulating 
committee or the patients? There are no general criteria for resolving this 
but different answers are given in different systems. They are linked to 
the competition for power to which I alluded, between market forces, 
religious forces, politicians, drug companies, doctors, and patients. It is 
rare for these competing forces to be recognized and addressed. They 
tend to be disguised by ethical and legal discussions. 
There are many ways to justify legislative regulation. One could start 
with the simple issue of safety. No new treatment which affects the 
bringing into being of a new life should be allowed to proceed unless 
there is as much evidence as can reasonably be obtained that there will 
be no harm to mother or baby. Human reproductive technology has 
tended to proceed under a precautionary principle, balancing the benefits 
to be obtained against the possible harm. Thus the introduction of intra-
cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) and frozen egg technology was de-
layed in Britain while assurances about their safety were sought. Safety 
bears on issues such as the insemination of women over sixty, cloning, 
posthumous births, and donor gametes. I regard it as legitimate to curb 
reproductive autonomy when its exercise unreasonably impacts on the 
independence of others or threatens harm. Multiple births with their at-
tendant private and public costs, sex selection with its effects on existing 
children, and PGD all have a long-lasting impact on society and may 
place a burden on others. It follows that society may have a legitimate 
reason to control through the democratic process the choices that may be 
made by individuals with their doctors.23 It is right to grasp the nettle and 
 
 23. Rosamund Scott, Choosing Between Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical Issues in 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 153, 175 (2006); 
see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 104 (1996); ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 58 
(2002); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE ch. 2 (1994); John Harris, Rights and 
Reproductive Choice, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 5, 34 (John Harris & 
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accept that reproductive autonomy can co-exist with regulation rather 
than leaving many profound issues to be decided, slowly, by individual 
court cases. 
Regulation is also called for to control the market forces in this field, in 
the way that any big business is legitimately a target of regulatory con-
trol. Some of Britain’s most well-known clinicians are reputed to be 
amongst the wealthiest men in the country. Because IVF and embryo 
research are big business, it is not wise to leave regulation to the profes-
sional bodies in the field because they will have conflicts of interest. 
Where there is a nationalized health system, decisions have to be made 
about resource allocation because resources spent on IVF and embryol-
ogy will have an impact on other areas of medicine and their effective-
ness has to be assessed. Britain accepts that it is dangerous to leave per-
sonal choice in IVF and the new genetics to market forces. In the United 
States it is accepted that IVF is a billion-dollar business, and even gam-
etes and surrogacy are for sale.24 There is an urgent need to control sale 
of gametes and embryos, like the sale of other organs, bearing in mind 
the dignity and vulnerability of individuals and the health and welfare of 
the potential baby. 
Identity and recordkeeping are especially important in regulation, in 
case IVF children as adults are entitled to seek information about the 
identity of the donors. A register of data is also important as an epidemi-
ological tool, searching for factors affecting the success of IVF, and pre-
senting data on multiple births, birth defects, and success rates. Confi-
dentiality of data should not be so strict that follow-up studies are ruled 
out. Of course a regulatory authority needs sufficient resources, without 
which the purpose is defeated and dangerous mistakes may be made. It 
 
Søren Holm eds., 1998). The state interest was spelled out in the case of Dickson v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 44362/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006). In this case a prisoner was 
refused the right to artificial insemination of his wife while he was in prison. The argu-
ment that society allows children to be born to single persons in poor circumstances was 
not regarded as sufficient to entitle the prisoner to achieve something similar. This was 
because the state was being asked to become an “active accomplice and participant” in 
the conception. Id. (Bonello, J., concurring). “I believe a responsible state to be right to 
require of itself standards higher than those beyond its control in the free procreation 
market.” Id. In Israel, Larissa Trimbobler sought artificial insemination by her husband 
Yigal Amir, who is in prison for life; the couple were granted conjugal visits.  
 24. The characteristics of potential gamete donors are available on the Internet, al-
though whether their descriptions match the reality is another issue. It has even been 
pointed out that in an unregulated market, an embryo could be split, and once one of the 
twins has been born and the other embryo frozen, the frozen one could be offered for sale 
knowing what its twin looked like. GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE, 
AND THE MARKET 11 (1998). 
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needs to be answerable to the legislature and to give a full account of its 
workings in a way that the public can access and understand. Its mem-
bers need to be appointed in a way that gives people without a profes-
sional interest a chance to be represented. My own experience was that a 
majority of lay members over professionals on the authority was a good 
thing. Expert evidence can always be acquired from outside the member-
ship. In particular, it needs to take evidence on the developments that lie 
ahead so that it is not caught unawares when a sudden application for 
new treatment is made or a new technique is problematic. It will be ex-
pensive and litigation can never be entirely avoided because there will be 
statutory interpretation issues arising from new developments and the 
regulator is bound to upset both clinicians and patients at some stage by 
its decisions. 
The country that is in most urgent need of regulation is the United 
States,25 because it is the most advanced scientific nation with an impact 
on all world science. Such federal law as there is appears to be concerned 
more with funding than with substance. There is no supervision of activi-
ties in IVF and embryo research; disasters are bound to happen. The pri-
vate companies that do research may do well, but this activity is not nec-
essarily undertaken with concern for public health and for the inequities 
between the medically insured and the uninsured Americans. There is a 
lack of clarity about standards and achievements because the private 
work is undertaken in conditions of commercial confidentiality and com-
petitiveness. It must surely be possible for the United States to establish a 
public oversight body and comprehensive legislation. The Council on 
Bioethics is no substitute; in fact it may provide false assurance because 
its powers are non-existent. 
But what is the reality of experiencing and administering regulation? 
Are there disadvantages? 
Regulation has to be financed, and it is the patients who bear the ex-
pense, which is passed on to them by the clinics. Relatively little free 
IVF treatment is undertaken by the U.K. National Health Service (NHS) 
and, even in those cases, the NHS has to absorb the extra cost repre-
sented by regulation, and therefore ultimately it reduces the resources 
available elsewhere in the hospital system. Regulation also engenders 
avoidance, not in the sense of law breaking, but in the practice of repro-
ductive tourism, going abroad to obtain a treatment banned at home. It 
stimulates constant discussion, criticism, and demands for reform. There 
 
 25. See George J. Annas, The Shadowlands: The Regulation of Human Reproduction 
in the United States, in CROSS CURRENTS 143 (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis 
Maclean eds., 2000). 
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are effective lobby groups and political opponents of any decision made 
by the regulators. 
In approaching a new decision in the regulation of embryology, the fol-
lowing are the factors that in practice determine the outcome in a regu-
lated environment. 
First, the legal framework. Every regulatory decision has to be taken in 
the knowledge that it is likely to be challenged in the courts, either by a 
disappointed individual or by a pressure group, and that it is important to 
the regulator to succeed in the litigation. There is in Britain no overarch-
ing written constitution that might ensure success on the basis of a higher 
principle of freedom. However, our detailed regulatory legislation is 
boxed in or, some would say, made porous, by recent human rights and 
European Treaty provisions. The application of the Human Rights Act 
1998 to legislation enacted before that date has tilted interpretation to-
wards individual rights and liberty in applying legislation that was al-
ready carefully drafted to balance public health demands and individual 
desires. The European Treaty principles of freedom of movement of 
goods and services, and the right to seek medical treatment abroad, may 
in the last analysis undo all the careful regulatory constraints applied in 
the home country. 
Second, money, to fight and to enforce. The regulatory authority needs 
to be sufficiently well-financed. Litigation cannot be brought to enforce 
the measures of a regulatory authority unless the authority has the funds 
available to fight a case all the way to the House of Lords (our Supreme 
Court). It is often the case that a popular litigant will be better funded by 
a newspaper to which he or she has sold his or her story, than the gov-
ernment authority in opposition. The HFEA was occasionally chastised 
for mistakes that were in truth unavoidable as long as the technology is 
in the hand of humans. A well-known example was the birth of black 
twins to a white couple, where the wrong sperm had accidentally been 
used in the clinic treatment. The consequent reprimands and demands for 
ever tighter regulation and inspection were made even while the Author-
ity was being denied the resources that would make seven-day-a-week 
supervision possible. 
Third, the power of the media in a small country where everyone reads 
the same newspapers and in general watches the same TV news. News-
paper and television coverage is often wholly inaccurate, but if there is a 
good human story, the more attractive of the two litigants will carry 
greater weight. When a young woman is featured in the media, making 
an appeal for a baby (by some risky method), it is clear that the public 
will side with her and that deeper issues in the decision will not be con-
sidered. 
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Fourth, politics. There is no doubt that government departments and 
ministers are apt to take a certain view in relation to questions that are 
widely debated, whether it is genetically modified food, fluoridation, or 
reproductive technology. While the pressures they exert may be indirect, 
they are nonetheless forceful. 
Finally, and only if there is any room at all left for debate and choice, 
ethics. The HFEA developed five ethical principles derived from the leg-
islation and from our deliberations on real cases day-by-day. The ethical 
considerations were bolstered by widespread public consultation. First 
was the assurance of human dignity, worth, and autonomy. In line with 
international conventions, nobody should be used as a convenience or as 
a bank of spare parts: consent and counseling are vital. No comatose or 
dying person should ever have gametes removed from them without their 
prior consent or even knowledge. Second, the welfare of the potential 
child. Consideration of its need for a father is enshrined in the legislation, 
although this requirement is now open to debate. Hence, the concern 
about cloning and the difficult family relationships that might ensue. 
Third, safety was given the greatest weight. Newly discovered treat-
ments, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis and egg freezing, were 
sometimes delayed for safety checks and trials of viability. Despite pub-
lic pressure and compassion for those seeking treatment, the safety of the 
child and mother must be considered. Fourth, respect for the status of the 
embryo. Legislation lays down the parameters of permitted research and 
prohibits the mixing of humans and animals, cloning, and research on 
embryos over fourteen days old. These principles informed decisions 
about, for example, the posthumous removal of sperm and the ban on sex 
selection for social reasons. 
A fifth principle has now emerged, which is that the saving of life is a 
good use to which new advances in embryology may be put. An example 
is the decision to allow preimplantation genetic diagnosis and HLA-
typing to attempt to create a sibling whose umbilical cord blood might 
save an older child. Another example is the legalization of stem cell re-
search. 
Despite these complications, there is no doubt in my mind that com-
prehensive regulation is urgently needed in every state of the United 
States. The visiting English regulator, listening to the debate in the 
United States about federal funding of stem cell research, finds herself on 
another planet. 
It seems obvious from history that one cannot commence the process 
of regulation with stem cell regulation, as if building an inverted pyra-
mid. One has to build up to it from a broad and tested base. One cannot 
regulate stem cell work more or less in a vacuum without a foundation of 
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data, sanctions, inspection, monitoring, and uniformity. This is all the 
more so since there is to my mind no genuine difference between stem 
cell research and other types of embryo research, with shared safety and 
ethical issues. There is no genuine moral distinction between the use of 
embryos for procreation, research, and stem cell growth. 
In the United States there appear to be too many cross-sector rules that 
are unenforceable and overlap: the NIH on research, the FTC on adver-
tising, the FDA on drugs, the ASRM on laboratory accreditation, and 
state licensing. Even within one state there is a proliferation of guidelines 
with no enforcement. The California Institute of Regenerative Medicine 
(CIRM) has guidelines for the use of its funds in research, but there is a 
second set of guidelines for non-CIRM research. 
Overall in the United States there seems to be no uniformity, or only 
fragmented rules, and reliance on professional self-regulation which is 
inherently weak. There appears to be no monitoring of the health of 
mothers and babies in IVF; no regulation of the extent of preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis; no oversight of the creation and disposal of embryos, 
or of the move from technology to safe medical treatment; no regulation 
of commerce in gametes; and no safe register of the names of donors and 
the outcome of the treatments. 
Casting a British eye over U.S. practice, there is a need for uniform 
substantive legislative prohibitions in relation to cloning, controls on ex-
periments in the womb and genetic manipulation; there is a need for sur-
veillance of laboratories and clinics, and enforcement of the fourteen-day 
rule for keeping embryos in the laboratory. There should be regulation of 
the buying and selling of gametes, and consideration should be given to 
legislation banning the patenting of embryological research. 
There is a need for U.S.-wide legislatively guaranteed procedures and 
openness. There should be studies of the health of IVF children and there 
should be publicity for the adverse consequences, if any, of certain 
treatments. Acknowledging the dangers of competition between clinics, 
there should be standards to ensure the integrity of statistics and to en-
able comparison between clinics. There should be good patient informa-
tion, a limit on the number of embryos to be used in any one treatment, 
uniform safety standards, and penalties for their breach. The United 
States needs laws about the destination of embryos after the expiration of 
the permitted storage period and in situations where previously given 
consents are unilaterally withdrawn, typically upon divorce. Patients’ and 
donors’ rights, information, and consent in relation to distant research 
will become increasingly important and must be addressed. There needs 
to be supervision by an independent, central, and transparent body of 
people empowered to grant licenses, monitor and permit research, and 
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impose sanctions backed by criminal penalties. Britain is not alone in 
having confidence in this method. It has been adopted in Canada, Austra-
lia, France, and Japan to some degree. 
Whatever the political disadvantages of, and the political jealousies 
engendered by British-style regulation of embryo research and use, these 
are minimum standards that are necessary. 
In conclusion, I argue that the benefits of regulation are overwhelming. 
Scientists are sometimes mistrusted; there is unacknowledged competi-
tion between the politicians who would like to control every move in this 
interesting and momentous area, and the clinicians who have, as one 
would expect, personalities to match the tremendous strides forward into 
the unknown they have made. (I heard one of them say: “I have made a 
thousand women pregnant.”) There is also the rich commercial market to 
be considered and the desires of patients who may be under pressure and 
uninformed. Only comprehensive regulation can hold the ring and bring 
order and consensus to this topic. 
